Special Agent Slotter serves with the FBI's New Haven, Connecticut, Field
Office. |
"The
future, my boy, is in plastics." When Dustin Hoffman's neighbor
uttered this line in The Graduate, little did he know how prescient
the statement would be, at least as it applies to the credit card
industry. Although, the character was not referring to credit cards
back when the film was released in 1967, no one can deny that the
credit card market has been booming during the past 30 years.
Industries that expand at such a
rapid rate often are vulnerable to fraud schemes devised by those
seeking to capitalize on new-found criminal opportunities, dated
security measures, and outdated laws. The credit card sector is no
exception.
Approximately 124 million of the 193
million adults in the United States owned at least one credit card
in 1994. Experts expect this gap to narrow over the next 6 years at
a rate of about 2.8 million new cardholders per year, as credit card
companies inundate prospective customers nationwide with more than
2.7 billion mailings and pitches.
The New York Times noted that
"...the sheer pace of this growth raises the question of
whether credit card lending is following in the checkered tradition
of loans to third world countries and speculative real estate
developers." Indeed, recent statistical data indicate that
credit card fraud is growing in proportion to industry advancements.
Around the world, bank card fraud
losses to Visa and Master-Card alone have increased from $110
million in 1980 to an estimated $1.63 billion in 1995. The United
States has suffered the bulk of these losses-approximately $875
million for 1995 alone. This is not surprising because 71 percent of
all worldwide revolving credit cards in circulation were issued in
this country. Law enforcement authorities continually confront new
and complex schemes involving credit card frauds committed against
financial institutions and bank card companies. Perpetrators run the
gamut from individuals with easy access to credit card
information-such as credit agency officials, airline baggage
handlers, and mail carriers, both public and private-to organized
groups, usually from similar ethnic backgrounds, involved in
large-scale card theft, manipulation, and counterfeiting activities.
Although current bank card fraud operations are numerous and varied,
several schemes account for the majority of the industry's losses by
taking advantage of dated technology, customer negligence, and laws
peculiar to the industry.
CREDIT CARD FRAUD SCHEMES
Visa and MasterCard account for
approximately 65 percent of all outstanding revolving credit, and
most substantive fraud cases involve schemes centered on one or both
of these bank cards. Law enforcement authorities repeatedly
encounter certain ethnic groups--particularly Asian and
Nigerian--and organizations involved in multilevel bank card fraud
operations.
Notably, nearly one-fifth of all U.S.
credit card losses occur in California, an amount close to the
combined total for the other five identified problem areas
worldwide: Florida, Texas, New York, Asia, and Great Britain. While
losses to Visa, MasterCard, and the financial institutions issuing
these cards continue to mount, several basic schemes have been
identified as most prevalent throughout the nation.
Mail/Credit Bureau Theft
One of the simplest ways to obtain
account information or actual bank cards is through postal theft.
Numerous Nigerian fraud rings operate sophisticated theft operations
throughout the eastern and southern regions of the United States.
Having illegally obtained legitimate bank cards or account
information, the group then creates portfolios of fictitious
identification, including driver's licenses, social security cards,
and other materials, to support the purchasing power behind those
cards. At the direction of group leaders, "runners"
purchase merchandise from a variety of sources until the legitimate
owners report the cards as stolen or confiscated.
These organizations also take
advantage of contacts within the various credit bureaus to obtain
legitimate bank card account information for counterfeiting or
telephone order purchasing. The groups commonly mail stolen cards
and information via overnight courier to other factions located
throughout the country. For this reason, the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service has implemented the Express Mail Label Profiling Program to
identify packages likely to contain contraband. The profile flags
suspicious packages based on mail quantity, delivery frequency,
destination, label and packaging material characteristics, etc. The
profile was developed initially to identify packages containing
drugs. Postal inspectors in the drug unit forward profiles to the
credit card fraud unit if they believe that non-drug criminal
activity is occurring. Through this program, postal inspectors can
trace the illicit mail to both its source and its destination, thus
identifying members of the fraud rings.
Advance Payment Schemes
Federal consumer credit regulations
require credit card issuers to credit a customer's account as soon
as payment is received, i.e., before the payment instrument has
cleared the bank. While this regulation is intended to protect
consumers, it also creates what a member of the California Bankers
Association calls a "window of opportunity for fraud."
The scheme is simple. Using a
counterfeit or stolen credit card, the group either makes an advance
payment on the card or overpays an existing balance using a bogus
check. Because the account is credited upon receipt of payment, cash
advances immediately can be drawn against the bank card before the
payment check has cleared. Through hundreds of like payments, a
criminal organization can realize profits in excess of $1 million
within a relatively short period of time.
Counterfeiting
The fastest growing type of bank card
fraud, in both frequency and severity, involves the illegal
counterfeiting of Visa and MasterCards. New technology has aided
criminals in producing exact replicas of existing cards and in
creating fictitious cards from scratch. Illegal counterfeiting is
primarily responsible for the overall upsurgence in credit card
fraud, particularly in California, a hotbed for Asian gang
counterfeiting activity. Credit card fraud in the state jumped from
$60 million in 1991 to $282 million in 1993, a 370-percent increase
in just 3 years.
THE COUNTERFEITING PROCESS
To understand the complexity and
nature of this fraud, it is important to review the methodology used
by counterfeiters in their operations. Until recently, most
counterfeit credit cards were manufactured using a silk screening
process that duplicated the card logo and background onto a plain
white plastic card. With improvements in technology, however,
counterfeiting a credit card has become a multi-step process, often
using desktop computer systems and peripherals, including embossers,
laminators, and tipping foil, to produce a more realistic looking
card, complete with a hologram and fully encoded magnetic strip.
Most of the supplies used to manufac- ture counterfeit bank cards,
in-cluding the white plastic cards and Visa/MasterCard holograms
(the Visa dove and the MasterCard interlocking globes), are smuggled
into the United States from the Far East.
The magnetic strips and holograms
used to counterfeit bank cards represent a distinct sub-market
within the criminal community. Currently, there are 87 firms
worldwide legally approved to manufacture cards with holograms for
members of Visa and MasterCard, and only two companies, De La Rue
(Great Britain) and American Bank Note Holographics (New York)
authorized to manufacture actual card holograms.
Credit card companies started using
holograms in 1981 as a safeguard against fraud; since then, however,
large-scale hologram counterfeiting operations have developed in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. A separate market emerged for
holograms, which usually sell for between $5 and $15, depending on
their quality.
Smugglers bring holograms into the
United States and Canada regularly. During April, 1994, the Canadian
Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit and Combined Forces Asian
Investigation Unit arrested members of a Chinese syndicate that
produced approximately 300,000 counterfeit holograms, of which
250,000 already had been distributed. Based on the quantity
delivered and using an estimated loss of $3,000 per card, Visa and
MasterCard anticipated losses approaching $750 million caused by
this group alone.
Often, the key to quickly identifying
a counterfeit card lies in an examination of the hologram. On
legitimate cards, the hologram is actually embedded in the plastic
upon manufacture; counterfeit credit cards commonly contain a
hologram decal purchased from an illegal distributor. These
holograms are affixed to the top of the card, rather than embedded
in the card, and can be seen or felt to rise slightly above the card
face.
Counterfeiters sell magnetic strips
for credit cards piecemeal. The strips contain names, account
numbers, credit limits, and other identifying information for
legitimate or contrived Visa/MasterCard card holders. Using a
computer system, source materials, and peripheral equipment, a
counterfeiter can compile a fraudulent bank card with relative ease.
TECHNOLOGICAL DETERRENTS
To combat the problem of fraud,
credit card manufacturers plan to employ a series of security
features, most of which are designed to enhance customer
identification and authorization requirements. Due to the
shortcomings of holograms as a fraud deterrent, credit card
manufacturers currently are modifying magnetic strip coding to
include a number of additional personal identifiers, such as
customer photographs, fingerprints, and personal histories.
Photographs on the face of credit cards have been used by financial
institutions for the past 25 years, but their value as a true fraud
deterrent has been questioned because such photos can be altered
easily. Eastman Kodak, Xerox, Gemplus and other companies have
developed systems to digitally encode a customer's photo within the
magnetic strip, enabling verification through specialized processing
terminals at the point of sale.
The next generation of credit card
technology involves the so-called Smart Cards, which will feature
computer chip technology in lieu of holograms. Specifically, each
card will contain a microprocessor memory chip, as well as data
encoded on the magnetic strip. In addition to providing extra
security benefits, the chip will allow customers to authorize
off-line transactions, store prepaid values, and conduct secure
transactions from remote locations. The chip will store more
personal information about the cardholder than that currently
available through the magnetic strip and will require the customer
to verify the personal identification number (PIN) encoded on the
microchip.
Although advancements in security
technology are encouraging, Smart Cards are unlikely to become
commonplace until after the year 2000. Neither Visa nor MasterCard
have yet been able to justify the estimated $7.4 billion required
over the next 5 years alone to establish the necessary
infrastructure to issue and accept such cards worldwide. As a
result, bank card fraud will remain an omnipresent concern for
white-collar fraud investigators well into the next century.
LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Undercover operations and cooperative
efforts among various federal, state, and local investigative
agencies have generated positive results in the fight against credit
card fraud. Investigators have succeeded in dismantling several
high-profile rings involving airline baggage handlers, postal
service employees, and other organized criminal groups.
In one case, Joseph Nuzzo, a former
crew chief at Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, led a credit
card mail theft ring consisting of 10 airline baggage handlers and
25 other subjects who routinely invaded passenger luggage in search
of bank cards and identification that could be easily counterfeited.
This group made more than $1 million in fraudulent credit card
charges, cash advances, and casino advances prior to their arrests
by U.S. Postal Service Inspectors. In Seattle, Washington, Julius
Camarillo Campo, several associates, and at least three postal
employees stole credit cards from the U.S. mail and conducted
fraudulent transactions in excess of $2.5 million. This successful
investigation led to a 3-year prison sentence for Campo and the
termination and prosecution of the postal employees involved.
With the rise in west coast Asian
counterfeiting activities over the past several years, authorities
in California increasingly have concentrated their efforts on
gathering intelligence and investigating gang credit card fraud
activities. On March 16, 1994, law enforcement officers from the
Bureau of Investigation of the California Department of Justice; the
Antioch, Oakland, and San Francisco Police Departments; the U.S.
Customs Service; the U.S. Secret Service; and the Drug Enforcement
Administration raided several residences in Antioch and Oakland and
uncovered a counterfeit credit card ring operated by members of the
Chinese gang Wo Hop To. Officers arrested numerous gang members and
confiscated counterfeiting equipment and fraudulently obtained
merchandise.
As important as these arrests were,
the intelligence information gathered from the raids has proven even
more valuable, providing insight into the general structure of Asian
organizational counterfeiting operations. This framework has been
supported by other investigations throughout the state and is
outlined as follows:
|
One
member imported all credit card counterfeiting
materials-including plastic, holograms, and magnetic
strips-from sources in Hong Kong; |
|
Another
member transported cash to Hong Kong in exchange for
counterfeiting paraphernalia; |
|
Two
members handled the actual counterfeiting operation, using
computers, laminators, and tipping foil to create and encode
credit cards with account information obtained from local
trash bins. They also re-embossed and re-coded valid
information onto older stolen cards; |
|
Two
members created counterfeit parallel forms of identification
to use in conjunction with the bogus credit cards; |
|
One
member tested each card by making small purchases at local
grocery stores, gas stations, and restaurants; |
|
A
host of low-level members, or runners, were recruited to make
purchases and withdraw cash against the cards, as directed by
the gang's leaders. The runners traveled with the cards
throughout the western United States, purchasing fine jewelry,
leather goods, and electronics equipment before returning to
their home base in California. |
In one of the largest joint credit
card fraud investigations, authorities from the FBI, U.S. Secret
Service, and local police departments in Orange County, California,
combined resources for "Operation Repayment." This case
targeted ringleader Minh C. To, also known as "Big Ming,"
and 41 others involved in massive credit card fraud operations.
In his scheme, To recruited
legitimate cardholders to overpay their credit card accounts using
counterfeit checks. Upon receipt by the bank, the customer's account
was immediately credited and To and the recruit would make purchases
throughout southern California. In turn, To would fence the
ill-gotten merchandise and split the profits with the recruit. The
scheme ended with To instructing the cardholder to file for credit
protection under federal bankruptcy law to avoid future bank
liability. One participant in the scam personally made $615,000 in
fraudulent purchases over a 1-year period. In all, parties to this
organization caused in excess of $100 million in Visa and MasterCard
fraud losses through more than 100 financial institutions.
THE FUTURE OF BANK CARDS
Within the next several years, the
term "credit card," as we know it, will become antiquated,
likely to be superseded by such terms as "banking card,"
"electronic payment card," or "check card." The
industry foresees a time when bank customers will be able to use a
single card to accommodate a variety of transactions, including
automatic teller machine (ATM) withdrawals, credit purchases, direct
bill payments, and purchases against predetermined stored value
levels. Several companies are currently working with Visa and
MasterCard on these services, and prototypes of stored value and
debit/credit combination cards are being test marketed and issued
throughout the country. The goal is to create a single card through
which customers can administer all their financial needs, from
paying bills via electronic transfer of funds to buying and trading
securities over the New York Stock Exchange. During 1995, Visa added
9.3 million debit/credit Check Cards to its portfolio, while
MasterCard added 2.5 million of its counterpart MasterMoney Cards.
In addition to these services,
financial institutions have begun to establish automatic loan
machines (ALMs), which can be accessed by customers or potential
customers using their bank cards. These machines offer individuals
the opportunity to obtain various types of financial loans without
having to meet personally with a bank representative. Although the
system is still in its infancy, bank officials envision ALMs
becoming as commonplace as current ATMs in this country.
CONCLUSION
If the past is any indication, these
fast-paced advances in technology likely will create previously
unseen fraudulent opportunities for criminals and criminal
organizations, as well as new challenges for law enforcement.
Despite some anticipated advances in security through the use of
Smart Cards and improved encoding, it remains unlikely that security
concerns will keep pace with marketing and customer convenience
technologies across the broad market. By the year 2000, gross bank
card volume is expected to total $9.9 trillion. Based on current
fraud ratios, cumulative credit card fraud losses between 1993 and
2000 will exceed $14 billion, almost three times the accumulated
loss of the previous 7 years.20 As bank card companies continue to
develop their own internal anti-fraud strategies, law enforcement
agencies must prepare for the challenges of investigating complex
fraud schemes. Spiraling industry growth need not lead to spiraling
crime rates.
For more information go to the FBI's
Website.
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